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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Denise Frances Nesbitt appeals from the restitution order entered upon
the judgment entered pursuant to her guilty plea to grand theft. On appeal,
Nesbitt argues the district court erred when it ordered her to pay restitution for all
of the victim’s stolen jewelry and abused its discretion when it based the market
value of the jewelry, in part, on the victim’s testimony regarding the purchase
price of the jewelry.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Gloria Buck hired Nesbitt to help her take care of her disabled daughter.
(R., p. 8.) After Ms. Buck hired Nesbitt, some of Ms. Buck’s jewelry began to go
missing from her bedroom. (Id.) Nesbitt was the only person who would have
been in Ms. Buck’s bedroom unaccompanied. (Id.) Ms. Buck contacted the
police and reported several items of jewelry were stolen, including: a gold
bracelet, a gold necklace, ladies earrings, a brass Kokopelli, a ladies Pulsar
wristwatch, a silver and coral ring, a Gucci pinkie ring, a man’s gold ring, a 1956
high school class ring, and a man’s ring with a red star Ruby Cabachon.
(R., pp. 9-10.)
The police discovered that Nesbitt pawned several pieces of jewelry that
matched Ms. Buck’s missing jewelry.

(R., pp. 8, 10.)

The pawn database

showed three transactions in which Nesbitt sold jewelry to the pawnshop.
(R., p. 10.) Nesbitt claimed that Ms. Buck’s daughter told her to pawn all the
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jewelry. (R., p. 11.) Ms. Buck’s daughter adamantly denied telling Nesbitt to
pawn the jewelry. (Id.)
The state charged Nesbitt with grand theft, alleging that, between January
1, 2014 and July 31, 2014, Nesbitt wrongfully stole “jewelry, of a value in excess
of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) from the owner, Gloria Buck[.]” (R., pp. 3738.) Nesbitt entered an Alford 1 guilty plea to the grand theft charge and agreed
to pay restitution. (9/16/15 Tr., p. 14, L. 25 – p. 15, L. 10; R., pp. 39-41.) The
state agreed not to file additional charges based on the police report. (R., p. 41.)
The state filed a Memorandum of Restitution and Nesbitt objected.
(R., pp. 46-52.)

The state filed an Amended Memorandum of Restitution

requesting $8,818 in restitution to Ms. Buck and $2,597 to American Family
Insurance, Ms. Buck’s insurance company. (R., pp. 53-58.)
The district court entered judgment and sentenced Nesbitt to five years
with two years fixed. (R., pp. 75-78.) The district court suspended the sentence
and placed Nesbitt on probation. (Id.) The district court reserved jurisdiction to
determine restitution following a restitution hearing. (Id.)
At the restitution hearing Ms. Buck testified regarding her missing jewelry
and Nesbitt asked the district court to consider portions of the PSI. (R., pp. 8391.) Based upon the evidence presented at the restitution hearing, the district
court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Restitution.
(R., pp. 92-101.) The district court considered factors in Idaho Code § 19-5304
and found the “total economic loss suffered by the victim to be $7,747.80.”

1

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
2

(R., p. 96.)

Nesbitt timely appealed from the entry of the restitution order.

(R., pp. 102-106.)
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ISSUES
Nesbitt states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err in awarding restitution for items
which were not within the scope of the offense for which
Ms. Nesbitt was convicted and for which she did not agree to
pay restitution?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in determining the
amount of restitution?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Nesbitt failed to show the plea agreement limited the scope of
restitution and thus failed to show the district court erred when it awarded
restitution to the victim based upon Nesbitt’s guilty plea to grand theft?
2.
Has Nesbitt failed to show the district court abused its discretion
when it determined the market value of the jewelry based primarily upon the
victim’s testimony regarding the purchase price of the jewelry?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Did Not Err When It Awarded Restitution To The Victim Of
Nesbitt’s Crime Based Upon Nesbitt’s Guilty Plea To Grand Theft
A.

Introduction
Nesbitt argues that she only agreed to pay restitution for the jewelry she

admitted to pawning. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-10.) Nesbitt’s argument is not
supported by the record. Nesbitt pled guilty to stealing jewelry with a value in
excess of $1,000 from Ms. Buck and she agreed to pay restitution.
(See R., pp. 37-41.) There is nothing in the plea agreement or plea colloquy that
limited restitution to only those items of jewelry that Nesbitt admitted to pawning.
The district court did not err by awarding restitution based upon Nesbitt’s guilty
plea to grand theft.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Plea agreements are contractual in nature and generally are examined

by courts in accordance with contract law standards.” State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho
370, 374, 161 P.3d 689, 693 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71,
73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005); State v. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 410–11, 64 P.3d
335, 336–37 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 741, 744, 52 P.3d
886, 889 (Ct. App. 2002)). “In interpreting the provisions of a contract, a court
must first determine whether those terms are ambiguous or unambiguous, for
the application of an unambiguous term is a question of law while the
interpretation of ambiguous language presents a question of fact as to the
parties’ intent.”

Id. (citing Doe, 138 Idaho at 410–11, 64 P.3d at 336–37).
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“Because the question whether a plea agreement is ambiguous is an issue of
law, it is reviewed de novo.” Id. (citing Fuhriman, 137 Idaho at 744, 52 P.3d at
889).

C.

Nesbitt Pled Guilty To Stealing Jewelry From Ms. Buck; Nothing In The
Plea Agreement Limited Her Restitution Obligations To Only Those Items
Nesbitt Admitted To Pawning
Nesbitt pled guilty to stealing jewelry from Ms. Buck. (R., pp. 37-41.)

After a restitution hearing the district court ordered Nesbitt to pay restitution for
the stolen jewelry. (R., pp. 92-101.) The district court did not err. “One of the
purposes of restitution is to obviate the need for victims to incur the cost and
inconvenience of a separate civil action in order to gain compensation for their
losses.” State v. Schultz, 148 Idaho 884, 886, 231 P.3d 529, 531 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 165, 167, 139 P.3d 767, 769 (Ct. App.
2006); State v. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 624, 97 P.3d 489, 491 (Ct. App.
2004)). “The restitution statute evidences a policy favoring full compensation to
crime victims who suffer economic loss.” Id. (citing State v. Smith, 144 Idaho
687, 692, 169 P.3d 275, 280 (Ct. App. 2007)). A “victim” is defined as “a person
or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result of the defendant’s
criminal conduct.” I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i). There must be a causal connection
between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the damages the
victim suffers. Shafer, 144 Idaho at 372, 161 P.3d at 691. Except where the
parties have consented, a defendant cannot be required to pay restitution for
damages stemming from separate, uncharged and unproven crimes. Id.
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Nesbitt pled guilty to grand theft for wrongfully taking jewelry from Ms.
Buck between the dates of January 1, 2014 and July 31, 2014. (R., pp. 37-40.)
The state filed a memorandum listing the jewelry that was stolen by Nesbitt.
(R., pp. 53-58.) At a restitution hearing, Ms. Buck testified regarding the jewelry
that went missing when Nesbitt worked at her house and the money paid by
insurance. (See 11/13/15 Tr. p. 8, Ls. 13-25, p. 15, Ls. 5-15, p. 20, Ls. 6-17,
p. 24, L. 9 – p. 26, L. 23, p. 29, L. 15 – p. 47, L. 19, p. 48, L. 7 – p. 49, L. 15;
Exs. 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9.)
The district court considered the “factors enumerated in Idaho Code § 195304, the record of Defendant’s criminal proceedings, [and] the evidence
presented at the restitution hearing” and exercised its discretion to determine the
“economic loss suffered by the victim as a consequence of the defendant’s
actions[.]” (R., p. 96.) Using its discretion the district court found “the total
economic loss suffered by the victim to be $7,747.80.” (Id.)
On appeal, Nesbitt argues that the district court erred because
“Ms. Nesbitt understood she would be required to pay restitution for the items
she pawned, for which she received approximately $700.” (Appellant’s brief, p.
7.) Nesbitt claims the restitution order should be limited to only those items she
admitted to pawning. (Id.) Nesbitt argues the other items of stolen jewelry for
which she was ordered to pay restitution, “were beyond the scope of the offense
for which Ms. Nesbitt was convicted and she did not agree to pay restitution as
part of her plea agreement.” (Id.)
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Nesbitt’s argument is not supported by the record. Nesbitt agreed to pay
restitution based on her guilty plea to grand theft, and nothing in the plea
agreement or plea colloquy limited the scope of her restitution obligation to only
those items she admitted to pawning. Nesbitt pled guilty to the following charge:
That the defendant, DENISE FRANCES FEHLING, AKA, DENISE
FRANCES NESBITT, on or about January 1, 2014, to July 31,
2014, in the in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did
wrongfully take personal property, to-wit: jewelry, of a value in
excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) from the owner, Gloria
Buck, with the intent to deprive another of property and/or
appropriate to herself certain property of another and/or
appropriate to a third person certain property of another, all of
which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such
case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the
People of the State of Idaho.
(R., pp. 37-40.) Nesbitt agreed to pay restitution and the state agreed not to file
additional charges based on the police report. (R., p. 41.)
THE COURT: All right. And according to this, she would also be
required to pay restitution, that the State would agree with the
sentence recommendation of a withheld judgment and would file no
additional charges from the report.
With what [defense counsel] indicated and what the Court
read, is this your understanding of the agreement, Miss Nesbitt?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
(9/16/15 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 13-21.)
THE COURT: Do you understand if you plead guilty, you may be
required to pay restitution to any victim of your crime?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
(9/16/15 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 4-7.)

Defense counsel clarified the factual basis for the

grand theft charge and described some of the items that were stolen. (9/16/15
Tr., p. 15, L. 18 – p. 16, L. 12.)
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you.
Your Honor, between January to October of 2014, there’s
allegations by an individual named Gloria Buck that while my client
was a caregiver in her house that my client wrongfully removed
jewelry from the house, including rings, necklace, and I believe a
bracelet from the residence, allegations that she intended to
deprive them permanently from Miss Buck, and that all happened
in Idaho.
(9/16/15 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 4-12.)

On appeal, Nesbitt cites to arguments made

regarding the scope of restitution; however, those arguments were made well
after Nesbitt pled guilty and agreed to pay restitution. (See Appellant’s brief,
pp. 9-10 (citing 10/29/15 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 13-17, p. 23, Ls. 16-20).) Those postguilty plea arguments were not part of the plea agreement.
Neither the plea agreement nor the plea colloquy limited restitution to only
those items of jewelry Nesbitt admitted to pawning.

2

(See R., p. 41; 9/16/15 Tr.,

p. 11, Ls. 13-21, p. 14, Ls. 4-7.) Because Nesbitt pled guilty to stealing jewelry
from Ms. Buck she was liable for the full value of the stolen property. See State
v. Davis, 156 Idaho 671, 675, 330 P.3d 417, 421 (Ct. App. 2014) (“Because the
loss of the full value of a stolen item is the direct and intended consequence of a
theft offense, the perpetrator’s restitution liability is ordinarily the full value of
property that was stolen.”).
The Court of Appeals’ decision in Schultz is instructive. See Schultz, 148
Idaho at 886-887, 231 P.3d at 531-532. At trial, the state presented evidence

2

Further undercutting Nesbitt’s argument is the fact that almost all of the jewelry
for which Ms. Buck sought restitution was listed in the police report attached to
the Affidavit In Support of Probable Cause on which the grand theft charge was
based. (R., pp. 6-14.)

9

that Schultz made unauthorized transactions using the victim’s ATM card;
however, at the restitution hearing “the state sought, and was awarded,
restitution for additional unauthorized individual transactions.” Id. at 885, 231
P.3d at 530. The Court of Appeals affirmed the restitution order. Id. at 886-887,
231 P.3d at 531-532. The Court of Appeals held that because Schultz was
convicted of committing grand theft by exercising unauthorized control over a
period of time, and no specific amount of money was alleged in the charging
document, Schultz was liable for restitution for all unauthorized transactions
during the time frame in question. Id.
As charged in the information, Schultz was convicted of committing
grand theft by exercising unauthorized control and/or making
unauthorized transfers of Shayne’s credit card accounts and/or
bank accounts in an amount exceeding $1,000 between October
2003, and May 2004. Schultz had access to all of the credit cards
for which unauthorized transactions were made. All of these
transactions, upon which the restitution award was based, were
within the scope of the grand theft for which Schultz was charged
and convicted.
Id.
The same analysis regarding the scope of Nesbitt’s restitution obligation is
true here. Nesbitt pled guilty to stealing in excess of $1,000 in jewelry between
January 1, 2014 and July 31, 2014. (R., pp. 37-40.) Therefore, like Schultz, the
scope of Nesbitt’s restitution obligations extended to all jewelry stolen during that
time period – not just the jewelry that Nesbitt admitted to pawning.
The Amended Memorandum of Restitution listed the “Jewelry stolen by
Denise Nesbitt.” (R., p. 57.) Ms. Buck only listed the items she was “positively
sure of.” (Id. (“These are the items I am positively sure of. There could be more
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items that I am not yet aware they are missing.”)) In addition to the jewelry,
Ms. Buck included on her list of stolen items a “Kindle e-book reader.” (Id.) At
the restitution hearing, the state did not seek restitution for the “Kindle e-book
reader.” (See R., pp. 83-91, 96.) The state limited its restitution request to the
stolen jewelry, and the district court only awarded restitution for the jewelry.
(R., p. 96.) The district court’s restitution order did not exceed the scope of the
charge.

The district court did not err when it awarded restitution for jewelry

stolen from Ms. Buck, between January 1, 2014 and July 31, 2014 because
Nesbitt pled guilty to stealing that jewelry, and because the plea agreement did
not limit restitution to only those items Nesbitt admitted to pawning.

II.
Nesbitt Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Determined The Amount Of Restitution
A.

Introduction
After a restitution hearing, the district court ordered Nesbitt to pay

restitution.

(R., pp. 92-101.)

The district court exercised its discretion and

entered the order based upon “the factors enumerated in Idaho Code § 19-5304,
the record of Defendant’s criminal proceedings, [and] the evidence presented at
the restitution hearing[.]” (R., p. 96.) On appeal, Nesbitt has failed to show the
district court abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed

to the trial court’s discretion. State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76, 78, 253 P.3d 750,
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752 (Ct. App. 2010).

A decision to award restitution will not be overturned

absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 391, 271 P.3d
1243, 1247 (Ct. App. 2012).

The trial court’s factual findings in relation to

restitution will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. State v.
Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013); State v. Corbus,
150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011).
In considering whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court
“conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine” whether the trial court (1) “correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion”; (2) “acted within the boundaries of
such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the
specific choices before it”; and (3) “reached its decision by an exercise of
reason.” State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 170, 345 P.3d 226, 229 (Ct. App.
2014) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).

C.

Nesbitt Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion
When It Awarded Restitution Based Upon Valuation Evidence Presented
At The Restitution Hearing
Ms. Buck testified about the value of her stolen jewelry. She testified that

her late husband purchased the ruby cabochon ring for $1,500 and also
purchased the one-of-a-kind gold feather pin for $1,500. (11/13/15 Tr., p. 8,
L. 1 – p. 11, L. 21; Ex. 1.) He also purchased an Omega gold necklace for
$1,500 (11/13/15 Tr., p. 12, L. 11 – p. 14, L. 8; Exs. 3, 6); a gold domed cuff
bracelet for $852.80 (11/13/15 Tr., p. 20, L. 13 – p. 24, L. 6; Ex. 8); a Gucci ring
for $500 (11/13/15 Tr., p. 24, L. 9 – p. 26, L. 23); and a ladies Pulsar watch for
$750 (11/13/15, p. 26, L. 25 – p. 31, L. 15; Ex. 9).
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Her husband’s father

purchased the men’s heavy gold ring for between $1,200 and $1,500. (11/13/15
Tr., p. 31, L. 16 – p. 41, L. 15.) Ms. Buck testified she purchased the sterling
silver bracelet for around $300 (11/13/15 Tr., p. 41, L. 17 – p. 42, L. 11); the
1956 high school class ring for $100 (11/13/15 Tr., p. 42, L. 12 – p. 43, L. 4); the
coral bracelet for $250 (11/13/15 Tr., p. 43, L. 5 – p. 44, L. 23); three pairs of
costume jewelry earrings for approximately $175 (11/13/15 Tr., p. 44, L. 22 –
p. 47, L. 1); and a brass Kokopelli pin for about $50 (11/13/15 Tr., p. 47, Ls. 216). Ms. Buck testified she submitted a claim to her homeowner’s insurance.
(11/13/15 Tr., p. 48, L. 7 – p. 49, L. 15.) Her policy had a limit of $5,000, with a
deductible of $2,500 (Id.) Her insurance company eventually issued her a check
for $2,597. (Id.) Nesbitt asked the district court to consider portions of the PSI.
(11/13/15 Tr., p. 70, L. 10 – p. 73, L. 3.)
The district court determined, based upon the amount of insurance paid
and the amount of the deductible, that $5,097.28 was a “reasonable starting
point for restitution.” (R., pp. 95-96.) From this starting point, the district court
considered and weighed the evidence presented and determined that Ms. Buck’s
valuation of some items did not reflect the altered condition and current value
and the “Court in, its discretion, has reduced the value of those items.”
(R., pp. 96-97.) The Court held:
This Court having considered the factors enumerated in
Idaho Code § 19-5304, the record of Defendant’s criminal
proceedings, the evidence presented at the restitution hearing, and
in exercising the Court’s discretion determines the economic loss
suffered by the victim as a consequence of Defendant’s actions as
follows:
1.

Men’s heavy gold ring – $500.00.
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Gold domed 12 mm cuff bracelet – $852.80.
Gucci ring – $500.00.
Ladies Pulsar wristwatch – $750.00.
Sterling silver domed cuff bracelet – $300.00.
1956 High School class ring – $25.00.
Coral bracelet – $250.00.
Costume jewelry earrings – $50.00.
Kokopelli coat pin – $20.00[.]
Gold feather pin – $1,500.00[.]
Omega gold necklace – $1,500.00.
Ruby Cabochon ring – $1,500.00.

(R., p. 96 (citing State’s Memorandum of Restitution).) “The Court finds the total
economic loss suffered by the victim to be $7,747.80.” (R., p. 96.) The district
court ordered that Nesbitt pay restitution in the amount of $5,150.52 to Ms. Buck
and $2,597.28 to American Family Insurance, Ms. Buck’s insurance carrier.
(R., p. 99.)
Nesbitt argues the district court abused its discretion when it awarded
restitution because, Nesbitt claims, the state failed to introduce “sufficient
evidence regarding either the market value or replacement cost of the items of
jewelry[.]” (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.) Specifically, she argues, “The district court
abused its discretion in awarding restitution based solely on Ms. Buck’s
testimony about the purchase price of her property.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)
Nesbitt’s argument is without merit.

The district court recognized its

determination of restitution was a discretionary decision and reached its
conclusion by an exercise of reason and within the bounds of the law.
(See R., pp. 92-101.)
The district court properly used its discretion to determine the market
value of the stolen property. In Idaho, the owner of property is competent to

14

testify as to its market value without qualifying the owner as an expert witness.
See State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507, 510, 960 P.2d 190, 193 (Ct. App.
1998) (citing State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 704 n. 1, 946 P.2d 1338, 1344 n. 1
(Ct. App. 1997)). In the context of restitution, “value means the market value of
the property at the time and place of the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily
ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time
after the crime.” I.C. § 18-2402(11)(a).
The method by which the district court determines a restitution amount is
left to the discretion of the district court. See State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819,
824, 242 P.2d 189, 194 (Ct. App. 2010). In Lombard, the district court used an
alternative method to determine a restitution amount, and the Idaho Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding, “A determination of an appropriate restitution amount
is left to the sound discretion of the district court. We defer to the weight given
by the district court to such evidence.” Id.
Here, Ms. Buck testified regarding the purchase price of the stolen
jewelry. The district court recognized the dispute and utilized its discretion:
The Court is aware that there was a dispute regarding the values
assigned to the items and to the items themselves. However, there
is no dispute that the Defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge
of grand theft. There is no dispute that a number of the above
referenced items were found in local pawn shops having been
brought in by the defendant.
(R., p. 97.)
The district court considered Ms. Buck’s testimony and used its discretion
to reduce the value of some of the items. (R., pp. 96-97.) The district court also
noted that, even though the parties agreed these precious metals have likely
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appreciated in value in the years since their purchase, there was no evidence
presented regarding the increase in value and, therefore, the district court could
not increase the value based on the appreciation. (Id.) After it analyzed the
evidence and the law regarding the definition of “value” the district court
determined that $7,747.80 was a “fair representation of the market value to the
victim of the property stolen by defendant.” (R., p. 98.)
Defendant in this case did not and likely cannot show how she was
prejudiced by an award based on the much lower, decades old
purchase price of the fine jewelry. Based on the credibility of the
victim and the foregoing considerations, the Court determines that
the values listed above are a fair representation of the market value
to the victim of the property stolen by the Defendant.
(R., p. 98.) The district court did not abuse its discretion by basing the market
value of the property on the credibility of the owner and testimony regarding the
value of the property at the time it was purchased.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the restitution order
entered by the District Court.
DATED this 15th day of August, 2016.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson________________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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